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]REcENT CASES

deposited acceptance rule. Weighing the arguments with reference not
to specific cases but to a rule of general application and recognizing
the general and traditional acceptance of the rule as well as the
modem changes in effective long-distance communication, it would
seem that the balance tips whether heavily or near imperceptively, to
continued adherence to the 'Rule in Adams v. Lindsell'." 4
James L. Avritt

LIEN-NECESSrrY

OF FILING STATEMiENT

OF LABOR AND

MATEmuALS

Fui masmD oR To BE Fumsmm BEFoRE DEE Is REcoRDED By PtmcHAsER.-The defendants and a building contractor signed a contract
of sale on May 7, 1957, for the construction of a house on land then
owned by the builder. Conveyance of title was to take place upon
completion of construction, with defendants paying the balance of the
purchase price at that time. The house was completed early in July
and on July 8, 1957, the transaction was closed with conveyance by
the builder and with complete payment by defendants. During the
first week of October defendants contacted plaintiff, a plumbing
contractor, and he proceeded to correct a substantial defect in the
plumbing work he had done under contract with the builder. Plaintiff
had not been paid by the builder for his original work. On December
11, 1957, plaintiff notified defendants of his intention to hold their
property liable for his claim as required by Ky. Rev. Stat. 376.010(3)
[Hereinafter referred to as KRS] and filed a statement of his lien
laim in the county clerk's office as required by KRS 376.010(2). This
was the first actual notice to defendants that plaintiff had not been
paid.
In this action to enforce the lien the chancellor held that defendants, as equitable titleholders, had been "owners" of the property
within the meaning of KRS 376.010(1) since May 7, 1957, and were
not intervening bona fide purchasers for value and without notice.
Therefore, he ruled that defendants were not entitled to protection
under KRS 376.010(2); that the work done in October was the last
work done under the plumbing contract; and that the notice given to
defendants on December 11, 1957, complied with KRS 376.010(3).
Accordingly, the chancellor sustained the lien. Held: Reversed. The
Kentucky Court of Appeals held that when the balance of the
purchase price was paid and the deed recorded on July 8, 1957,
defendants became bona fide purchasers for value and without notice
14

Morrison v. Thoelke, 155

So. 2d 889, 904 (1963).
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entitled to priority over the lien since plaintiff had not filed the statement in the county clerk's office as required by KRS 876.010(2)
showing that he had furnished or expected to furnish labor and
materials before defendants recorded their deed. Walker v. Valley
Plumbing, Inc., 370 S.W.2d 136 (Ky. 1963).
This case raises the question of how the doctrine of equitable
conversion should be applied in relation to Kentucky's mechanic and
materialman lien laws. It turns primarily on the interpretation one
gives the word "owner" in KRS 376.010(1). The chancellor held that
"owner" meant legal or equitable owner; the Court of Appeals held
that it meant only legal owner.
The chancellor's decision is not without merit. The whole vendorpurchaser relationship is based upon the doctrine of equitable conversion. The equity court regards the purchaser of realty, under a
contract of sale, as the equitable owner even though legal title has not
been transferred to him. The vendor is merely holding the title in
trust for the purchaser's benefit and as a means of security for the
payment of the balance of the purchase price.'
In instances where buildings are destroyed by fire before title has
passed, this fiction of the law in the majority of jurisdictions places the
burden or risk of loss on the purchaser on the theory that the purchaser is the equitable owner and should, therefore, bear the loss. A
minority of jurisdictions, however, place the loss on the vendor
because of a failure of consideration on the vendor's part allowing
the purchaser to rescind the contract of sale and recover any down
payment he has made. A third view prevails in states which have
adopted the UNioimu VENO AND PURCHASER RiSK Acr. This statutory
rule places the loss on the possessor of the property on the theory
that the party in possession has a duty to guard against the loss with
insurance. 2 Kentucky, with only slight deviation,3 has firmly followed
4
the majority viewpoint.
Another application of this doctrine is seen in cases where one of
the parties to the contract of sale dies before title has passed. Specific
performance of the contract can be demanded by either party's heirs.5
If we interpret KRS 876.010(1) in the light of KRS 876.060, which
provides for the personal liability of an "owner" who sells his property
1 De Funiak, Modem Equity § 87, at .07 (2d ed. 1956).
2 Id. § 93, at 218.
3 Johnston v. Jones, 51 Ky. 326 (1851).
4 Godfrey v. Alcorn, 215 Ky. 465, 284 S.W. 1094 (1926); Cottingharn v.
Firemans Fund Ins. Co., 90 Ky. 439, 14 S.W. 417 (1890); Marks v. Tichenor, 85
Ky. 536, 4 S.W. 225 (1887); Martin v. Carver's Admr., 8 Ky. L. Rep. -56, 1 S.W.
199 (1886); Calhoun v. Belden, 66 Ky. 674 (1868).
5 De Funiak, Modem Equity § 87, at 208 (2d ed. 1956).
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at a time when a lien might attach and within the time for filing a
lien, we see that perhaps the legislature intended the meaning given
"ovner" by the chancellor in the case at bar. In part, KRS 376.060
provides:
If the owner of any legal or equitable interest in land or improvements
thereon contracts for labor or material used in the erection, repair or
improvement of any structure thereon.... (Emphasis added.)

Harlan F. Stone, in a very exhaustive note,6 exposes the doctrine
of equitable conversion for what it is, a fiction in the law. In instances
where the doctrine of equitable conversion has been heavily leaned on
to reach a decision, he shows the same decision could have been
reached by the proper application of the principles of equity. He
further points out the relationship of the right of specific performance
to equitable conversion:
It is thus apparent that the theory of equitable ownership of land, subject to a contract of sale, is literally an incident of the right of specific
performance, and cannot exist apart from it. 7

True as this may be, in the principal case the defendants would
have had the right of specific performance for the land before the
house was built and the same right to the house and the land after the
house was built. Thus, it seems the Kentucky Court of Appeals does
not look with favor upon the doctrine of equitable conversion.
Today, one might ask what would be the effect of this decision
as regards the development of large subdivisions with a substantial
time interval between the completion of work by the subcontractor
on the first house and his completion of work on the fiftieth house.
Under such circumstances our statutes seem to provide adequate
protection for the subcontractor. Three possible approaches are
available to the subcontractor with a non-severable contract for certain
work on all the houses. One of the safest approaches would be for the
subcontractor, immediately upon completion of each house, to file in
the county clerk's office the statement of labor and materials furnished
or to be furnished, as required by KRS 376.010(2), and if he had not
contracted with the owner, to give notice of his intention to hold the
property liable as required by KRS 376.010(3). This would insure the
priority of his lien over any subsequent conveyance by the general
contractor or subdivider in nearly all instances since such recordation
would constitute constructive notice to a purchaser.
A second approach would be for the subcontractor to wait until
he had finished the last house and then file one notice for the entire
'13
Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract, 13 Colum. L. Rev. 369 (1913).
7Id. at 386.
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work in the county clerk's office and, if he had not contracted with the
owner, give notice of his intention to claim a lien.8 The third approach
would be to file one notice in the county clerk's office pursuant to
KRS 376.010(2) immediately after signing the subcontract. If the
lien claimant had not contracted with the owner, he would then have
up to seventy-five days after finishing his work on the last house to
give notice as required by KRS 376.010(3).
James Avery Shuffett

SECUIUTIEs-ExPANDED CONCEPT OF F AuD-INvES

ENT Anviss Acr

OF 1940.-The Securities and Exchange Commission brought this action
against the defendant, a registered investment adviser. On several
occasions defendant bought shares of stock for its own account.
Shortly after each purchase it recommended the purchased security
to clients for long term investments. Following a rise in the market
price of the recommended security, defendant immediately sold its
shares at a profit. The defendant failed to disclose these transactions
to its clients. The Commission requested an injunction under the
Investment Advisers Act of 19401 compelling defendant to disclose
to its clients any dealings in recommended securities. The United
States District Court of New York denied relief. 2 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.3 Certiorari was
granted. Held: Reversed and remanded. The Commission may obtain
an injunction compelling an investment adviser to disclose to clients
8

True, the houses which had been conveyed and their deeds recorded
would escape his lien, as this case so holds, but KRS 376.060 provides a remedy:
!fthe owner of . .. land or improvements thereon contracts for . . .
material used in the erection . . . of any structure thereon under such
circumstances that a lien for the payment thereof may attach to the
property, and sells . . . the property before the expiration of the time
provided for the filing and recording of a . . . materialman's lien, he
shall, on receiving the consideration for the sale . ., pay in full any
sum owing for . . . materials, unless released in writing by the person
furnishing the . . . materials... . (Emphasis added.)
The above statute entitles the subcontractor to a personal judgment for those
amounts not covered by an enforceable lien. It provides for the personal judgment
since all the houses sold were sold (1) at a time when a lien might attach, (2)
before the expiration of the time for filing the lien, and (3) when the lien could
not attach because of the provisions of KRS 376.010(2). This is true by virtue of
the fact that we proceeded under one non-severable contract whereby the time
limits of KRS 376.010(2) and KRS 376.010(3), needed to perfect the lien, did
not begin running until the completion of the last house. Will B. Miller Co. v.
Laval, 283 Ky. 55, 140 S.W.2d 376 (1940); Paterson v. Miller, 283 Ky. 60,
140 S.W.2d 879 (1940). .
154 Stat. 847 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (1960).
2 191 F.Supp. 897 (1961).
3 300 F.2d 745 (1961), aff'd on rehearing306 F.2d 606 (1962).

